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The expected value of a lotto ticket depends on the particular numbers selected on the payslip. 
This is because (in most lotto games around the world) the individual prizes are not fixed in 
advance; instead, a prize pool is divided between all the players with winning tickets. This 
means that if you choose a popular set of numbers, your share of the prize will be low, should 
you win. The expected value of every ticket would be the same if all players were to choose 
their numbers randomly and independently. However, previous studies show that the actual 
distribution of the numbers chosen by players is far from uniform. Many players select 
numbers which are lucky, or which have personal significance.
In this paper, 1 posit a group of “rational” players, who choose their numbers randomly, but 
specifically avoid the superstitious numbers. For these players, the expected value of a lotto 
ticket is higher, the greater the number of superstitious people, and the smaller the set of 
combinations that they play. Despite the low prize payout rates in most lotto games, I show 
that the expected value may even exceed the ticket price, in which case the purchase of lotto 
tickets by the rational players may be consistent with standard Expected Utility theory, even if 
they are risk averse.
* I would like to thank Professors Spyros Vassilakis and Ian Walker, and Andy 






















































































































































































Since its introduction less than twenty years ago, lotto has become the most 
popular lottery game in both Europe and the US. It offers players the chance to 
win extremely large prizes, at very long odds. The value of the prizes is 
determined by the level of sales. So as people buy more tickets, the prizes get 
bigger. In any given draw, there is also a small probability that no ticket will win 
the jackpot, in which case it is added to the jackpot for the next draw. This 
rollover boosts ticket sales further, so that the prizes become bigger still.
The success of lotteries in general, and lotto in particular, has vexed economists 
over the past century. The standard mechanism for modelling the demand for 
lotteries is to treat a lottery ticket as an uncertain prospect, and then to estimate 
its Expected Utility. Unfortunately, under the standard assumption that people 
are risk averse, no fair gamble of any kind would ever be accepted. Certainly, 
nobody would ever buy a lotto ticket, which typically returns as little as 50% of 
the price of the ticket to prizes, according to Expected Utility theory.
A variety of explanations have been proffered to account for the demand for 
lottery tickets. Friedman and Savage (1948) suggested abandoning the 
assumption that people are risk averse, at least over a certain range of income 
levels. Their solution was a utility curve that is first concave, then convex, and 
finally concave again. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) claimed that people tend 
to overestimate very small probabilities, and thus to overvalue lottery tickets. 
Conlisk (1993) presented a model which appends a tiny utility of gambling to an 
Expected Utility model.
All of these models explain the demand for certain types of lottery. However, in 
the case of lotto, there is a another, simpler explanation which may account for 
the purchase of tickets by at least some players. It stems from the “interactive” 
design of the game, which allows players to choose their own numbers, and from 
the fact that winning tickets are not necessarily unique.
In a typical version of lotto, players mark six numbers from a play grid which 
contains the numbers 1 through to 49.' In each draw, six winning numbers are 
randomly chosen. Anyone who matches their six numbers with the winning 
combination claims a share of the jackpot prize. If no ticket matches the winning
1 Variants of 6/49 lotto are played around Europe, including France, Germany, Portugal, 



























































































combination, the jackpot is “rolled over” to the next draw. There are usually 
several tiers of smaller prizes, for people who match 3, 4 or 5 numbers.'
Since players with winning tickets have to share the prize with other winners, the 
value of the individual prizes in each draw is not known in advance, but depends 
on the level of sales and the number of winners. This also means that the 
expected value of each lotto ticket depends on the number of other players who 
have the chosen the same combination.
Under the assumption that “all numbers are equal”, so that players choose their 
numbers randomly and independently, the expected number of winners is the 
same for every combination. However, there is considerable evidence which 
suggests that some numbers, and combinations of numbers, on the play grid are 
much more popular than others. This means that there may be big differences in 
the expected value of lotto tickets with different combinations. So the expected 
value of some tickets may be considerably higher than the prize payout ratio, and 
possibly higher even than the price of the ticket.
To test this hypothesis, I replace the assumption that all numbers are equal, and 
acknowledge the fact that some (possibly most) people play numbers which are 
special to them, regardless of how popular those numbers might be. I postulate 
that there is a second group of people who choose their numbers randomly, but 
specifically avoid those combinations which are known to be special. Under this 
assumption, I can then calculate the expected value of a lotto ticket for these 
“rational” players.
2. Design of Lotto and Choice of Numbers
The expected value of a lotto ticket depends on the probability of matching the 
ticket’s numbers with the winning numbers, the size of the prizes, and the 
number of other people with winning tickets (with whom the prizes are shared). 
The design of the game thus ensures that the expected value of each ticket is not 
simply the prize payout ratio.
The probability of winning a prize is based on the size of the play grid, and the 
number of selections from the grid. To win the jackpot, for example, it is 
necessary to match all six numbers on your ticket with the winning numbers. If 
you have to choose six numbers between 1 and 49, then there are 13,983,816 2
2 Sometimes an extra bonus number is drawn, in which case the prize tier immediately below 




























































































possible combinations (this is So the probability of winning the jackpot
works out at about 1 in 14 million.
The total value of the prizes to be awarded in each draw is a fixed proportion of 
sales (the prize payout ratio) plus the rollover, if there is one. Usually, a fixed 
percentage of the total prize pool (excluding the rollover) is allocated to each 
tier.* 4 If there is a rollover from the previous draw, this is added to the jackpot.
Because the prize money in each tier is shared between all the winning tickets in 
that tier,5 the number of other winners enters the calculation of the expected 
value of a lottery ticket. But this requires some assumption on the numbers 
which people choose. The standard assumption is that players choose their 
numbers randomly and independently.
In reality, the numbers chosen by players are far from random.6 People choose 
numbers which represent particular dates or events (such as birthdays), or 
personal lucky numbers. Some choose their combination of numbers such that 
they form a pattern on the play grid. Others make sure their numbers are not too 
close together (often in the misguided belief that this makes their choice of 
numbers more random).
Clotfelter and Cook (1989) analysed the choice of combinations on the 
(approximately) 5 million tickets purchased on a particular day for the 6/40 lotto 
game in Maryland. They found that the most popular 34% of combinations 
accounted for 73% of sales. The most popular combination was {1,2,3,4,5,6}, 
which was played more than 2,000 times the average rate.
Many lotto games now offer a “Quick Pick” (or “Lucky Dip”) option, in which 
the lottery terminal selects random numbers for the player. Although some 
people choose their numbers in this way (Lucky Dip accounts for 10% - 15% of 
lotto sales in the UK), by far the majority of players still prefer to choose their 
own numbers.
5 "C, is defined as n!/r!(n-r)!
4 This is not necessarily the case, however. The UK National lottery, for example, offers a 
fixed small prize (£10) to each winner in the lowest prize tier. The value of these prizes Ls 
subtracted from the prize pool before the rest of the money is distributed to the other tiers.
5 With possible exceptions (see footnote 4).




























































































3. Calculating the Expected Value
In this section, I calculate the expected value of a ticket in a non-rollover draw 
for a simplified version of lotto, in which there is just one tier of prizes, so that all 
the prize money is channelled towards the jackpot. This simplification makes the 
analysis clearer. I discuss the implications of relaxing it in section 5.
To replace the standard assumption that all numbers are chosen randomly and 
independently, 1 make the following stylized assumption. Suppose that there are 
two types of lottery players. The first type, whom I will label “superstitious” 
players, choose numbers which are somehow special or meaningful. The second 
group of players, whom I will call “rational”, choose their numbers quasi- 
randomly. That is, they pick their numbers at random from the set of possible 
combinations, excluding the combinations which are chosen by superstitious 
players.
I also assume that it is common knowledge (at least amongst the rational players) 
which combinations of numbers are chosen by the superstitious players. Thus 
the total set of combinations is split into two disjoint sets, one of which contains 
superstitious numbers, the other the rest of the numbers. Each rational player 
chooses their numbers randomly and independently from the set of non- 
superstitious numbers.
Under this assumption, it is possible to calculate the expected value of a lotto 
ticket for a rational player. It is not possible to work out the expected value of 
those tickets with superstitious numbers without making further assumptions, as 
the expected value will be different for each ticket, depending on the popularity 
of each individual combination. The point is that it is not necessary to know the 
distribution of the superstitious numbers in order to calculate the expected value 
of the tickets bought by the rational players.
In order to demonstrate the impact of assuming a skewed distribution, I first 
derive the expected value of a lotto ticket under the standard assumption that all 
numbers are chosen randomly and independently.
3.1 When All Numbers Are Equal
This result was worked out by Lim (1995).7 Let 0  be the number of tickets sold 
at one unit of currency each, and let r be the prize payout ratio. Then the total 
jackpot J is equal to rQ, assuming that there is no rollover. This jackpot is 
shared between the winning tickets.




























































































Let p be the probability of winning the jackpot. If the lotto game is 6/49 (as 
described above), then p is equal to l/^Q,. It follows that the probability of a 
certain player not winning is equal to 1-p. The probability that there are no 
winners at all (i.e. the probability of a rollover) is then (l-p)°, under the 
assumption that the numbers on each ticket are chosen randomly and 
independently.
The probability that the jackpot is awarded (to at least one person) is thus 
l-(l-p)0. So the expected prize awarded to the Q tickets considered in aggregate 
is equal to the probability that the jackpot is awarded multiplied by the expected 
jackpot rQ:
Total Expected Prize ■= -  (l -  p)° j rQ.
By symmetry, the expected value of a single ticket is just a Q’th share of the total 
expected prize. This gives the following formula for the expected value of a 
lottery ticket in a non-rollover draw:8
EV = r [ l - ( l - p ) ° ] ,  (1)
This expression is the product of the prize payout ratio and the probability that 
the jackpot is awarded (i.e. that there is no rollover to the next draw). To get a 
feeling for the importance of the separate components, consider a 6/49 lotto game 
with a 45% payout ratio. Suppose that 65 million tickets are sold.9 Then the 
probability that the jackpot is awarded is equal to 0.990 (to 3 decimal places). 
So the expected value of a ticket works out at slightly less than the payout ratio, 
0.45.
3.2 When Some Numbers Are More Equal Than Others
In order to fully specify the distribution, I must introduce two new variables: the 
proportion of tickets bought by players who are superstitious (s), and the 
proportion of the combinations of numbers which are chosen by superstitious 
players (n).
Suppose that the total number of combinations on the play grid is N. So for the 
lotto game described above, N is equal to 13,983,816. (Note that N is the 
reciprocal of p.) So the number of superstitious tickets is equal to sQ, and they 
cover «N of the possible combinations. This means that the rational players buy
8 If there is a rollover R, the formula becomes: EV =  ̂r + —J ĵ l -  (l




























































































(1-a’)Q tickets, and choose their numbers randomly and independently from the 
remaining (l-n)N combinations.
1 will now calculate the expected value of a lotto ticket for a rational player, 
using the standard formula:
E V = 2 (p ,E V ,) , (2)
( = 1
where i represents each of the N possible combinations, p, is the probability that 
combination i wins, and EV; is the expected value of a rational player’s ticket 
given than combination i wins.
Without loss of generality, I will assume that the first /iN combinations are the 
superstitious ones. So for the range of combinations from 1 to «N, EV, will be 
equal to zero, since rational players never choose these numbers (by assumption). 
Note also that p, is equal to p for all i, since every combination has an equal 
probability of winning. So equation (2) reduces to:
EV = p V E V r  (3)
Now suppose that a non-superstitious combination is the winning set in the draw. 
Denote this event by NSC. Let the probability that a rational player wins, given 
that a non-superstitious combination has come up, by Pnsc- Each rational player 
is choosing randomly from (l-n)N numbers. So the probability of any ticket 
chosen by a rational player winning is given by:
1
Pnsc "  ( f -7 )N '
The probability that a rational player loses, given that a non-superstitious 
combination of numbers has come up, is 1-pNsc- Then the probability that there 
are no winners is equivalent to the probability that all the rational players lose 
(given that no superstitious player will have chosen this combination, by 
definition of it being non-superstitious). So the probability of no winners is given 
by:
P(no winners N s o  = ( i - PNSCr °
1
(l -  n) N
( l - v ) O
since the (l-s)Q rational players each choose their numbers randomly and 




























































































P(jackpot awarded | NSC) 1___p
( 1 - m)N/
The total expected prize to the rational players, given that a non-superstitious 
combination wins, is the probability that the jackpot is awarded multiplied by the 
jackpot rQ.
Total Expected Prize | NSC i t" -»
( l -n )N /
rQ.
By symmetry, the expected value of each ticket bought by a rational player is an 
equal share of this expected prize:




Returning to the original expected value formula in equation (3), EV, is the same 
for all values of i within the range of non-superstitious numbers, and is equal to 
Expected Value | NSC. So the expected value of a lotto ticket for a rational 
player is:
EV = p(l -  n)N
1 -s
1 - 1 (l-n )N
0“V)Q
Finally, substituting p = 1/N gives:10
' 1 -nEV = r
1 - s
1 - 1 -
1 - n
( l - . , ) 0
(4)





























































































4. Examining the Results
I shall first look at the expected value of a specific lotto game, for different 
values of n and s. 1 will then generalise the results.
4.1 Specific Example
Again, consider a 6/49 lotto game with a 45% prize payout ratio, for which 65 
million tickets are sold in each draw. Using the notation above, 
p = 1/13,983,816, r = 0.45, and Q = 65,000,000. The next table shows the 
expected value of a rational player’s lotto ticket (which costs one unit of 
currency) for different values of s and n in a non-rollover week.
0.1
Proportion of players who play superstitious numbers (.9) 
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 0.45 0.50 0.56 0.64 0.75 0.88 1.06 1.30 1.63
0.2 0.40 0.45 0.51 0.58 0.68 0.81 0.99 1.24 1.59
Proportion 0.3 0.35 0.39 0.45 0.52 0.61 0.73 0.91 1.16 1.53
of 0.4 0.30 0.34 0.38 0.45 0.53 0.64 0.81 1.06 1.46
combinations 0.5 0.25 0.28 0.32 0.37 0.45 0.55 0.70 0.95 1.36
which are 0.6 0.20 0.22 0.26 0.30 0.36 0.45 0.58 0.81 1.24
superstitious 0.7 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.27 0.34 0.45 0.64 1.06
<«) 0.8 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.22 0.30 0.45 0.81
0.9 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.22 0.45
Table 1: Expected value o f a ticket in a non-rollover week
When all numbers were assumed to be equal, the expected value of a lotto ticket 
was equal to 0.45 (after rounding to two decimal places). Now, allowing for the 
fact that not all numbers are equal, the table shows that it is the relationship 
between the two variables, s and n, which determines by how much the expected 
value differs from the payout ratio. When .v and n are equal, whatever value they 
actually take, the expected value is still approximately equal to the payout ratio 
(the difference is only apparent beyond the second decimal place).
The expected value to a rational player of a ticket increases, the higher is the 
proportion of superstitious players, and the lower is the proportion of 
superstitious numbers. And if there are enough superstitious players choosing 
few enough combinations, the expected value may even rise above the price of 
the ticket (these are the highlighted cells in the table). The flip side is that if 
there are relatively few superstitious players choosing from a large range of 
numbers, then the expected value to rational players may be considerably less 
than the payout ratio.
One interesting implication from this analysis, from an economist’s point of view, 




























































































lotto tickets by the rational players may be consistent with standard Expected 
Utility theory, even if the players are risk averse. However, as the table shows, a 
very skewed distribution is required. And of course, Expected Utility theory still 
has nothing to say about why the majority of players, the “superstitious” ones, 
continue to play lotto.
The following example illustrates by how much the expected value may vary, 
depending on the skew of the distribution of the numbers chosen. Suppose that 
80% of the players are superstitious, and choose from 40% of the possible 
combinations of numbers. Then a lotto ticket is a good gamble for a rational 
player: its expected value is 1.06, slightly higher than the price of the ticket. So 
even risk averse players might be attracted to the game.
But now suppose that only 40% of players are superstitious, and choose from 
80% of the combinations. Then the expected value of a lotto ticket is only 0.15. 
Appropriate advice to rational players in this case would be for them to swallow 
their pride, and consult their nearest clairvoyant to choose their numbers.
Using the results obtained by Clotfelter and Cook for the Maryland game (see 
Section 2), if 73% of tickets are purchased by superstitious players, choosing 
from 34% of the combinations, then the expected value of the rational players’ 
tickets, if they choose randomly and independently from the remaining 
combinations, is 0.94. This is only slightly less than the price of the ticket.
Finally, consider a rollover draw. Suppose that the value of the rollover is 9 
million, and that sales rise to 75 million." Under the standard assumption that all 
numbers are chosen randomly and independently, the expected value of a ticket 
rises to 0.57. Table 2 shows the expected value for different values of s and n 





on of players who play superstitious 
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
numbers (.9) 
0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 0.57 0.64 0.72 0.83 0.97 1.16 1.42 1.79 2.30
0.2 0.51 0.57 0.65 0.75 0.88 1.06 1.32 1.68 2.23
Proportion 0.3 0.44 0.50 0.57 0.66 0.78 0.95 1.20 1.56 2.14
of 0.4 0.38 0.43 0.49 0.57 0.68 0.83 1.06 1.42 2.02
combinations 0.5, 0.32 0.36 0.41 0.47 0.57 0.70 0.91 1.26 1.88
which arc 0.6 0.25 0.28 0.33 0.38 0.46 0.57 0.75 1.06 1.68
superstitious 0.71 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.28 0.34 0.43 0.57 0.83 1.42
(«) 0.8 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.23 0.28 0.38 0.57 1.06
0.9 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0 .11 0.14 0.19 0.28 0.57
Table 2: Expected value o f a ticket in a rollover week




























































































In a rollover week, it requires a smaller difference between the proportion of 
players who are superstitious and the proportion of numbers that they play to 
ensure that the expected value for the rational players is greater than the ticket 
price. So the implication that a lotto ticket might be attractive to Expected 
Utility-maximizing risk averse players is considerably more plausible in a 
rollover week than in a normal week.
4.2 Generalizing the Results
Although the results described above relate to a specific example, they can all be 
generalized. In order to do this, it is first worth examining the separate 
components of equation (4).
4.2.1 Examining the Components of Expected Value
The expected value formula is the product of three terms. The first term is the 
prize payout ratio. The second is the ratio between 1 -n and 1-s. This is the 
proportion of numbers available to the rational players divided by the proportion 
of players who are rational.
The final term, in square brackets, is the probability that the jackpot is awarded 
given that a non-superstitious combination wins. It is usually very close to one, 
reflecting the fact that the probability of a rollover is very small. This can be 
verified by examining the order of magnitude of the variables in the expression: 
in a typical lotto game, N (the reciprocal of p) and Q will be very large, generally 
both measured in hundreds of thousands, if not millions. The extreme values of p 
and Q tend to dominate the expression.
The only circumstances in which this third term might be significantly less than 
one is when there are few rational players choosing between a large set of 
numbers, i.e. when the value of s is high and n is low. Then the probability that 
nobody wins the jackpot when a non-superstitious combination comes up 
becomes significantly greater than zero, and the probability that the jackpot is 
awarded is accordingly significantly less than one.
4.2.2 Evaluating the Expected Value
First, consider the expected value of a ticket for a rational player whenever s is 
equal to n. The second term in equation (4) reduces to one, and since the term in 
square brackets will always be very close to one, the expected value will be 
approximately equal to the value of the payout ratio.
Next, look at how the expected value (EV) of a ticket changes as s and n change. 
Intuitively, the more people known not to play your numbers, the fewer people 




























































































derivative with respect to s (dEV/fts) should be positive. And as more 
combinations are available to rational players, fewer tickets are likely to win 
when any given non-superstitious combination comes up. So the partial 
derivative with respect to n (dEV/dn) should be negative. The numbers in Table 
1 support both these arguments.
However, if you look at the separate components of expected value in equation 
(4), the impact of changes in n and s is ambiguous. As s increases, the second 
term (the ratio of 1 -n and 1-s) also increases, but the third term (the probability 
that the jackpot will be awarded given that a non-superstitious combination wins) 
decreases. While as n increases, the second term decreases, but the third term 
increases. So the expected value is not necessarily always increasing with s and 
decreasing with n.
In order to determine the conditions under which dEV/ds > 0 and dEV/dn < 0, it 
is necessary to examine the partial derivatives of EV with respect to these two 
variables. This exercise reveals that the following conditions are sufficient to 
ensure the required signs of the partial derivatives:'2 dEV/ds is always positive, 
and dEV/3n is always negative, provided (l-n)N and (l-v)Q are both greater than 
one. These conditions are equivalent to requiring that there is more than one 
rational player choosing from more than one non-superstitious combination of 
numbers. So it is reasonable to assume that these conditions are satisfied.
To summarize, I have shown that whenever the proportion of players who are 
superstitious is equal to the proportion of the combinations that they play, the 
expected value of a lotto ticket for a rational player is approximately (actually 
slightly less than) the prize payout ratio. The expected value increases as the 
proportion of superstitious players increases, and decreases as the proportion of 
numbers which are superstitious increases.
5. Allowing For Multiple Tiers Of Prizes
In the previous two sections, the prize structure of the lotto game under analysis 
contained just one tier. In fact, games are typically designed with four or five 
prize tiers, as described at the start of the paper. The natural extension of the 
analysis above would be to take this feature into account.
Under the standard assumption that all numbers are selected randomly and 
independently, this is a straightforward exercise. Denote the number of tiers by 
T. Let the probability of winning a prize in tier t be p,. Suppose that the total 
prize pool is split between the tiers in fixed proportions j, (where 0 <j, < 1 and 12




























































































2j, = 1). Then the expected value of a ticket is just the sum of the expected 
values of winning in each of the prize tiers.
EV = r 2 [ l - ( l - p , ) ° ] j , .
However, when I assume a skewed distribution, it is no longer possible to extend 
the analysis to multiple prize tiers. This is because it is not possible to calculate 
the expected number of winners in the lower tiers.
To illustrate the problem, consider again a lotto game in which players choose six 
numbers from 49. As usual, the top prize is shared between the players who 
match all six of their numbers to the winning set. Note that, depending on 
whether or not the winning combination is a superstitious set of numbers, the 
jackpot will be shared either between superstitious players or between rational 
players. But it can never be shared between players from both groups.
Now consider the prize tier for players who match (exactly) five numbers out of 
six. Let J5 be the total value of the Match 5 prize. Then the expected value for a 
rational player who matches five numbers may be calculated as follows:
0-1 j
Expected Prize | Match 5 = X1 P(exactly m other winners) —— .
m+\
The problematic term in this equation is the expression for the probability that 
there are exactly m other winners. When the other winners are known to be all 
rational players, as is the case for the jackpot prize, it is possible to calculate this 
expression for any number of other winners. However, the set of combinations 
which match exactly five out of six numbers13 may include some superstitious 
and some non-superstitious combinations. Because the distribution of the 
superstitious combinations is not uniform, the probabilities of the number of other 
winners depends on what the winning combination actually is. So it is 
impossible to calculate the expected value of a lotto ticket for a rational player, 
without making further assumptions on the distribution of the superstitious 
combinations.






























































































In this paper, I assumed that lotto players can be divided into two groups: a 
group of “superstitious” people who choose special numbers on their tickets, and 
a group of “rational” players who choose their numbers randomly, avoiding the 
superstitious numbers. I then calculated the expected value of a lotto ticket for 
the rational players.
For a simplified version of lotto, with a single tier of prizes, the results show that 
when the proportion of players who are superstitious is the same as the 
proportion of combinations that they choose, then the expected value of a ticket 
for a rational player is approximately equal to the prize payout ratio of the game. 
The expected value rises when there are more superstitious people playing a 
smaller range of combinations. It is even possible that the expected value 
exceeds the ticket price, particularly when there is a rollover draw. In this case, 
the purchase of lotto tickets by rational players may be consistent with standard 
Expected Utility theory, even if the players are risk averse.
This analysis cannot be extended to allow for several tiers of prizes, without 





























































































A l. Appendix One
In Section 3.2, the expected value of a lotto ticket for a rational player was 
calculated as:
EV = r (— —)
where r is the prize payout ratio, s is the proportion of tickets bought by players 
who are superstitious, n is the proportion of the combinations of numbers which 
are chosen by superstitious players, p is the probability of winning the jackpot, 
and Q is the number of tickets sold at one unit of currency each.
This appendix contains the proof that the partial derivative of expected value 
with respect to s (3EV/3s) is positive, and the partial derivative with respect to n 
(3EV/3n) is negative, provided that (1-«)N > 1 and (l-s)Q > 1.




A l.l The partial derivative with respect to s
Taking the partial derivative of EV with respect to v gives:
dEV 1 -n
“ r (l -  s f
Making the substitution:




( l -v ) Q
V 1 p
( I - h)n J





{ l + v[ln V -  l]}.
(Al)
(A2)
Since r > 0 and n and s are only defined in the range [0,1], the partial derivative 
with respect to .s is positive provided that n * 1, s * 1, and the term in curly 
brackets is positive.
Denote the term in curly brackets by y(V):




























































































Then the first two derivatives of y with respect to V are:
— - = In V, and 
dV
d 2y  1
dV2 ~ V '
So y(V) has a minimum at V = 1; y( 1) = 0 and y is positive for all other values of 
V. V is the probability that there are no winners given that a non-superstitious 
number wins. So V * 1 provided that (l-s)Q * 0. Also, to ensure that the 
function V is defined, it is necessary that (l-n)N * 0.
So the conditions (l-n)N > 1 and (l-s)Q > 1 are sufficient to ensure that 
_y(V) > 0, n * 1 and 5 * 1. These conditions are thus sufficient to ensure that the 
partial derivative of expected value with respect to 5 is positive.
A l.2 The partial derivative with respect to n
The partial derivative of expected value with respect to n is:
V (l—-v)0—1
dEV r K 1
(5/1 l - s  
Making the substitutions:
(l -  n)N
1 M z i P z l
( l-n )N
-1  • (A3)
V = (l -  /i)N 
W = (l -  5)Q -  1,
equation (A3) simplifies to:
dEV _ r 
(5/1 1 -5
Define y(V,W) as follows:








Then the expression for <5EV/dn simplifies further to: 
dEV r 
d/l ~ M V> w)-1}'
(A4)
(A5)
Since r > 0 and s is only defined over the range [0,1], the value of the first term in 




























































































(l-s)Q > 1 is sufficient to ensure that this is the case. Then dEV/chr is negative if 
and only if y( V,W) < 1.
Below, I prove that y(V,W) < 1, provided that (l-n)N > 1 and (l-.v)Q> 1, 
considering separately the three cases W < V, W = V, and W > V. Note that, 
using the definitions of V and W, the conditions (1-/j)N > 1 and (l-.s)Q > 1 
simplify to V > 1 and W > 0.
Al.2.1 When W < V
First, note that y(V,W) < 1 if and only if In y(V,W) < 0. From equation (A4),
lny(V,W) = W l n ( l - l ) + ln ( l  + ^ )  . (A6)
The Maclaurin’s expansion for ln(l + x) is: 
ln(l + s ) - - x -
2 + 3 4 +'"
(-1 < x < 1).
This can be used to expand the logarithmic terms in equation (A6), under the 
assumptions that V > 1 and W/V < 1:
rwV w |
l ( 1} / vv'/ “ Tv7/
X ^ f e V < w* M - ; d ï <w‘ 4
By rearranging the expression in curly brackets, it can be shown that:
i _ ! (w ‘-'-i)— L-(w*+i)<o~ w ;-
+ 2 V V ; k + 1v '  W‘ +
Now it can easily be shown that, for any x,
W**1 -1  k + 2.< -----V.
1 k + 1
(A7)
< x x > -1 .
x" +1
Using this result, and the assumption that V > W > 0, we have:
W‘* '- l  k+ 2----r-----  < W < V < ------V.
W* +1 k + 1
Putting this result back into equation (A7), it follows that the term in curly 
brackets is negative. Since every term in the expansion of In y(V,W) is negative, 




























































































A 1.2.2 When W = V
In this case, equation (A4) simplifies to:
V
Taking the natural log of y and using the Maclaurin’s expansion for ln(l + jc) 
gives:
Since (In 2 - 1) is negative, and the summation term is positive for all j, In y is 
negative. Again, this ensures that y(V,W) < 1.
Al.2.3 When W > V
Unfortunately, the Maclaurin’s expansion cannot be used when W > V, since 
W/V is not less than one, and so In (1+W/V) cannot be expanded. The proof is 
obtained by evaluating the partial derivative of y  with respect to V or W. This, 
combined with the results obtained above, is sufficient to prove thaty(V,W) < 1.
From equation (A4), the partial derivative of y with respect to V is:
The assumptions that V > 1 and W > 0 ensure that dy/dV > 0.
Now consider any two values V] and Wt, such that Wi > Vj. From the result 
obtained in Section Al.2.2, we know that y(W],Wi) < 1. We also know that, as 
the value of V falls from Wi to V] (keeping W fixed), y(V,W) also decreases, 
since By/BW > 0. So:
Since this result holds for any W, and V1; such that Wt > V,, it follows that 
y(V,W) < 1. (This result can also be obtained by showing that the partial 
derivative By/dW < 0, in which casey(Vi,Wi) < ^(V^Vi) < 1 when W, > V,.)
I have now established that y(V,W) < 1, under the three cases W < V, W = V, 
and W > V. This implies that BEV/dn < 0, provided that (l-n)N > 1 and 
(l-s)Q > 1.





























































































Clotfelter, C. T. and P. J. Cook (1989). Selling Hope: State Lotteries in 
America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Conlisk, J. (1993). The Utility of Gambling. Journal o f Risk and Uncertainty 
6(3): 255-275.
Cook, P. J. and C. T. Clotfelter (1991). The Peculiar Scale Economies of 
Lotto. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3766.
— (1993). The Peculiar Scale Economies of Lotto. American Economic Review 
83(3): 634-643.
Friedman, M. and L. J. Savage (1948). The Utility Analysis of Choices 
Involving Risk. Journal o f Political Economy 56(4): 279-304.
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Decision Under Risk. Econometrica 47(2): 263-291.
La Fleur, T. and La Fleur, B. (1995). La Fleur’s 1995 European Lottery 
Abstract. TLF Publications.
Lim, F. W. (1995). On the Distribution of Lotto. Australian National 
































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge 
-  depending on the availability of stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) -  Italy 




□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1997/98





































































































Working Papers of the Department of Economics 
Published since 1994
ECO No. 94/1 
Robert WALDMANN 
Cooperatives With Privately Optimal 





Can Forecasters’ Modves Explain 








On the Interacuons of Unit Roots and
Exogeneity
ECO No. 94/5
Bernadette GOVAERTS/David F. 
HENDRY/Jean-Francois RICHARD 
Encompassing in StaUonary Linear 
Dynamic Models
ECO No. 94/6
Luigi ERMINI/Dongkoo CHANG 
Tesung the Joint Hypothesis of Ralional- 
ity and Neutrality under Seasonal Coin- 




Unobserved Components in ARCH 
Models: An Applicadon to Seasonal 
Adjustment *
ECO No. 94/8
Niels HALDRUP/Mark SALMON 
Polynomially Cointegrated Systems and 
their Representadons: A Synthesis *
ECO No. 94/9 
Mariusz TAMBORSKI 
Currency Opdon Pricing with Stochastic 
Interest Rates and Transacdon Costs:
A Theoretical Model
ECO No. 94/10 
Mariusz TAMBORSKI 
Are Standard Deviations Implied in 
Currency Opdon Prices Good Predictors 
of Future Exchange Rate Volatility? *
ECO No. 94/11
John MICKLEWRIGHT/Gyula NAGY 
How Does the Hungarian Unemploy­




An Elementary Account of Am art’s 
Expected Geometry *
ECO No. 94/13 
Domenico Junior MARCHETO 
Procyclical Productivity, Externalities 
and Labor Hoarding: A Reexamination of 
Evidence from U.S. Manufacturing *
ECO No. 94/14 
Giovanni NERO
A Structural Model of Intra-European 
Airline Competition *
ECO No. 94/15 
Stephen MARTIN 
Oligopoly Limit Pricing: Strategic 
Substitutes, Strategic Complements
ECO No. 94/16 
Ed HOPKINS 
Learning and Evolution in a 
Heterogeneous Population *
ECO No. 94/17 
Berthold HERRENDORF 
Seigniorage, Optimal Taxation, and Time 
Consistency: A Review *
ECO No. 94/18
Frederic PALOMINO
Noise Trading in Small Markets *
ECO No. 94/19 
Alexander SCHRADER 
Vertical Foreclosure, Tax Spinning and 





























































































Andrzej BANIAK/Louis PHLIPS 
La Pléiade and Exchange Rale Pass- 
Through
ECO No. 94/21 
Mark SALMON
Bounded Rationality and Learning; 
Procedural Learning
ECO No. 94/22 
Isabelle MARET 
Heterogeneity and Dynamics of 
Temporary Equilibria: Short-Run Versus 
Long-Run Stability
ECO  No. 94/23
Nikolaos GEORGANTZIS 
Short-Run and Long-Run Cournot 
Equilibria in Multiproduct Industries
ECO  No. 94/24
Alexander SCHRADER
Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure:
Comment
ECO  No. 94/25
Jeroen HINLOOPEN 
Subsidising Cooperative and Non- 
Cooperadve R&D in Duopoly with 
Spillovers
ECO  No. 94/26
Debora DI GIOACCHINO 
The Evolution of Cooperation: 
Robustness to Mistakes and Mutation
ECO  No. 94/27
Kristina KOSTIAL
The Role of the Signal-Noise Ratio in
Cointegrated Systems
ECO  No. 94/28
Agustfn MAR A V ALL/V fetor GÔMEZ 
Program SEATS “Signal Extraction in 
ARIMA Time Series” - Instructions for 
the User
ECO No. 94/29 
Luigi ERMINI
A Discrete-Time Consumption-CAP 
Model under Durability of Goods, Habit 
Formation and Temporal Aggregation
ECO  No. 94/30
Debora DI GIOACCHINO 
Learning to Drink Beer by Mistake
ECO No. 94/31
Victor G6MEZ/Agustfn MARAVALL 
Program TRAMO ‘Time Series 
Regression with ARIMA Noise, Missing 
Observations, and Oudiers" - 
Instructions for the User
ECO No. 94/32 
Akos VALENTIN YI 
How Financial Development and 
Infladon may Affect Growth
ECO No. 94/33 
Stephen MARTIN





Estimation Error and the Specificadon of 
Unobserved Component Models
ECO No. 94/35 
Robbin HERRING
The “Divergent Beliefs” Hypothesis and 
the “Contract Zone” in Find Offer 
Arbitradon
ECO No. 94/36 
Robbin HERRING 
Hiring Quality Labour
ECO No. 94/37 
Angel J. UBIDE




Credible Purchases of Credibility 
Through Exchange Rate Pegging:
An Optimal Taxadon Framework
ECO No. 94/39 
Enrique ALBEROLAILA 
How Long Can a Honeymoon Last? 
Institutional and Fundamental Beliefs in 
the Collapse of a Target Zone
ECO No. 94/40 
Robert WALDMANN 
































































































Flows to and from Insured
Unemployment in Hungary
ECO  No. 94/42
Barbara BOEHNLEIN 
The Soda-ash Market in Europe: 
Collusive and Competitive Equilibria 
With and Without Foreign Entry
ECO No. 94/43
Hans-Theo NORMANN
Stackelberg Warfare as an Equilibrium




Conditional Heteroskedasticity in 
Nonlinear Simultaneous Equations
ECO No. 94/45
Frank CRITCHLEY/Paul MARRIOTT/ 
Mark SALMON
On the Differential Geometry of the Wald 
Test with Nonlinear Restrictions
ECO No. 94/46
Renzo G. AVESANI/Giampiero M. 
GALLO/Mark SALMON 
On the Evolution of Credibility and 
Flexible Exchange Rate Target Zones *
ECO No. 95/1
Paul PEZANIS-CHRISTOU 
Experimental Results in Asymmetric 




Robust Estimation: An Example *
ECO No. 95/3
Giampiero M. GALLO/Barbara PACINI 
Risk-related Asymmetries in Foreign 
Exchange Markets
ECO No. 95/4
Santanu ROY/Rien WAGENVOORT 




Third Package and Noncooperative 
Collusion in the European Airline 
Industry *
ECO No. 95/6
Renzo G. AVESANI/Giampiero M. 
GALLO/Mark SALMON 
On the Nature of Commitment in Flexible 
Target Zones and the Measurement of 
Credibility: The 1993 ERM Crisis *
ECO No. 95/7
John MICKLEWRIGHT/Gyula NAGY 
Unemployment Insurance and Incentives 
in Hungary *
ECO No. 95/8 
Kristina KOSTTAL
The Fully Modified OLS Estimator as a 
System Estimator: A Monte-Carlo 
Analysis
ECO No. 95/9 
Gunther REHME
Redistribution, Wealth Tax Competition 
and Capital Flight in Growing 
Economies
ECO No. 95/10
Grayham E. MIZON 
Progressive Modelling of 
Macroeconomic Time Series: The LSE 
Methodology *
ECO No. 95/11
Pierre CAHUC/Hubert KEMPF 
Alternative Time Patterns of Decisions 
and Dynamic Strategic Interactions
ECO No. 95/12 
Tito BOERI
Is Job Turnover Countercyclical?
ECO No. 95/13
Luisa ZANFORLIN 





Thick-Market Externalities in U.S. 





























































































ECO  No. 95/15 
Berthold HERRENDORF 
Exchange Rate Pegging, Transparency, 
and Imports of Credibility
ECO No. 95/16
Gunther REHME
Redistribution, Income cum Investment 
Subsidy Tax Competition and Capital 
Flight in Growing Economies *
ECO No. 95/17
Tito BOERI/Stefano SCARPETTA 
Regional Dimensions of Unemployment 
in Central and Eastern Europe and Social 
Barriers to Restructuring
ECO  No. 95/18 
Bernhard WINKLER 
Reputation for EMU - An Economic 
Defence of the Maastricht Criteria *
ECO No. 95/19
Ed HOPKINS
Learning, Matching and Aggregation
ECO No. 95/20
Dorte VERNER
Can the Variables in an Extended Solow 
Model be Treated as Exogenous? 
Learning from International Comparisons 
Across Decades
ECO  No. 95/21 
Enrique ALBEROLA-ILA 




Predicting the Signs of Forecast Errors *
ECO No. 95/23 
Robert WALDMANN 
The Infant Mortality Rate is Higher 
where the Rich are Richer
ECO No. 95/24
Michael J. ARTIS/Zenon G. 
KONTOLEMIS/Denise R. OSBORN 
Classical Business Cycles for G7 and 
European Countries
ECO No. 95/25
Jeroen HINLOOPEN/Charles VAN 
MARREWUK
On the Limits and Possibilities of the 
Principle of Minimum Differentiation *
ECO No. 95/26 
Jeroen HINLOOPEN 
Cooperative R&D Versus R&D- 
Subsidies: Cournot and Bertrand 
Duopolies
ECO No. 95/27
Giampiero M. GALLO/Hubert KEMPF 
Cointegration, Codependence and 
Economic Fluctuations
ECO No. 95/28 
Anna PETTINl/Stefano NARDELLI 




Rules of Thumb and Local Interaction *
ECO No. 95/30
Robert WALDMANN
Democracy, Demography and Growth
ECO No. 95/31
Alessandra PELLONI
Nominal Rigidities and Increasing
Returns
ECO No. 95/32 
Alessandra PELLONI/Robert 
WALDMANN
Indeterminacy and Welfare Increasing 
Taxes in a Growth Model with Elastic 
Labour Supply
ECO No. 95/33
Jeroen HINLOOPEN/Stephen MARTIN 
Comment on Estimation and 
Interpretation of Empirical Studies in 
Industrial Economics
ECO No. 95/34 
M.J. ARTIS/W. ZHANG 
International Business Cycles and the 
ERM: Is there a European Business 
Cycle?
ECO No. 95/35 
Louis PHLIPS
On the Detection of Collusion and 
Predation
ECO No. 95/36
Paolo GUARDA/Mark SALMON 





























































































ECO No. 95/37 
Chiara MONFARDINI 
Simulation-Based Encompassing for 
Non-Nested Models: A Monte Carlo 
Study of Alternative Simulated Cox Test 
Statistics
ECO  No. 95/38 
Tito BOERI




Temporal Aggregation of a VARIMAX 
Process
ECO  No. 95/40
Massimiliano MARCELLINO 
Some Consequences of Temporal 
Aggregation of a VARIMA Process
ECO No. 95/41
Giovanni NERO
Spatial Multiproduct Duopoly Pricing
ECO  No. 95/42
Giovanni NERO
Spatial Multiproduct Pricing: Empirical 
Evidence on Intra-European Duopoly 
Airline Markets
ECO  No. 95/43 
Robert WALDMANN 
Rational Stubbornness?
ECO  No. 95/44
Tilman EHRBECK/Robert 
WALDMANN
Is Honesty Always the Best Policy? 
ECO  No. 95/45
Giampiero M. GALLO/Barbara PACINI 
Time-varying/Sign-switching Risk 
Perception on Foreign Exchange Markets
ECO  No. 95/46
Victor GÓMEZ/Agustfn MARA V ALL 
Programs TRAMO and SEATS 
Update: December 1995
ECO No. 96/1 
Ana Rute CARDOSO 




Workers or Employers: Who is Shaping
Wage Inequality?
ECO No. 96/3
David F. HENDRY/Grayham E. MIZON 
The Influence of A.W.H. Phillips on 
Econometrics
ECO No. 96/4 
Andrzej BANIAK
The Multimarket Labour-Managed Firm 




The Evolution of Algorithmic Learning:
A Global Stability Result
ECO No. 96/6
James DOW
Arbitrage, Hedging, and Financial 
Innovation
ECO No. 96/7 
Marion KOHLER
Coalitions in International Monetary 
Policy Games
ECO No. 96/8
John MICKLEWRIGHT/ Gyula NAGY 
A Follow-Up Survey of Unemployment 
Insurance Exhausters in Hungary
ECO No. 96/9 
Alastair McAULEY/John 
MICKLEWRIGHT/Aline COUDOUEL 
Transfers and Exchange Between 
Households in Central Asia
ECO No. 96/10
Christian BELZIL/Xuelin ZHANG 
Young Children and the Search Costs of 
Unemployed Females
ECO No. 96/11 
Christian BELZIL
Contiguous Duration Dependence and 































































































Learning from Learning in Economics
ECO No. 96/13 
Luisa ZANFORLIN 
Technological Diffusion, Learning and 
Economic Performance: An Empirical 
Investigation on an Extended Set of 
Countries
ECO No. 96/14
Humberto LflPEZ/Eva ORTEGA/Angel 
UBIDE
Explaining the Dynamics of Spanish 
Unemployment
ECO  No. 96/15
Spyros VASSILAKIS
Accelerating New Product Development
by Overcoming Complexity Constraints
ECO  No. 96/16
Andrew LEWIS 




Employment Reallocation, Wages and 
the Allocation of Workers Between 
Expanding and Declining Firms
ECO No. 96/18
Christian BELZIL/Xuelin ZHANG 
Unemployment, Search and the Gender 
Wage Gap: A Structural Model
ECO No. 96/19
Christian BELZIL
The Dynamics of Female Time Allocation 
upon a First Birth
ECO  No. 96/20
Hans-Theo NORMANN 
Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model 
with Incomplete Information
ECO No. 96/21
Ramon MARIMON/Fabrizio ZILIBOTTI 
‘Actual’ Versus ‘Virtual’ Employment in 
Europe: Is Spain Different?
ECO No. 96/22 
Chiara MONFARDINI 
Estimating Stochastic Volatility Models 
Through Indirect Inference
ECO No. 96/23 
Luisa ZANFORLIN 
Technological Diffusion, Learning and 
Growth: An Empirical Investigation of a 
Set of Developing Countries
ECO No. 96/24
Luisa ZANFORLIN 
Technological Assimilation, Trade 
Patterns and Growth: An Empirical 





In Plato’s Cave: Sharpening the Shadows 
of Monetary Announcements
ECO No. 96/26 
Dimitrios SIDERIS 
The Wage-Price Spiral in Greece: An 
Applicauon of the LSE Methodology in 
Systems of Nonstadonary Variables
ECO No. 96/27
Andrei SAVKOV
The Optimal Sequence of Privadzauon in 
Transidonal Economies
ECO No. 96/28
Jacob LUNDQUIST/Dorte VERNER 
Opumal Allocation of Foreign Debt 
Solved by a Multivariate GARCH Model 
Applied to Danish Data
ECO No. 96/29
Dorte VERNER
The Brazilian Growth Experience in the 




How Much to Collude Without Being 
Detected
ECO No. 96/31 
Angel J. UBIDE
The International Transmission of Shocks 
in an Imperfectly Competitive 
International Business Cycle Model
ECO No. 96/32
Humberto LOPEZ/Angel J. UBIDE






























































































On the Efficiency of Bertrand and





The Econometric Analysis of Economic
Policy
ECO No. 96/35 
Christian SCHLUTER 
On the Non-Stationarity of German 
Income Mobility (and Some Observations 
on Poverty Dynamics)
ECO No. 96/36 
Jian-Ming ZHOU
Proposals for Land Consolidation and 
Expansion in Japan
ECO No. 96/37
Susana GARCIA CERVERO 
Skill Differentials in the Long and in the 
Short Run. A 4-Digit SIC Level U.S. 
Manufacturing Study
-Y- if-
ECO No. 97/1 
Jonathan SIMON
The Expected Value of Lotto when not all 
Numbers are Equal
*out of print
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
